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ABBREVIATIONS HEREIN

The Plaintiffs-Appellants are sometimes
hereinafter referred to as the "Andersons" or as "Mr."
or "Mrs. Anderson".

The Defendant-Respondent Mid

Valley Investment is sometimes hereinafter referred
to as "Mid Valley."

The Defendant-Respondent Capitol

Thrift and Loan Company is sometimes hereinafter referred to as "Capitol Thrift."

The premises at 246

South 11th East, Salt Lake City, Utah, in which Mrs.
Anderson had her office, and which also contains several apartments is sometimes hereinafter referred to
as the "11th East commercial property."

The premises

at 474 East 12th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, in which
the Andersons live is sometimes referred to as the
"12th Avenue home".

The 11th East commercial property

and 12th Avenue home are hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as the "Andersons properties1 or the
"properties".

Pages of the record on appeal are here-

inafter referred to as "R [page]."

Pages of the

Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief on appeal are hereinafter
referred to as "P.-App. Brief [page]."

The Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure are hereinafter referred to as "UTAH
R. CIV. P."

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

The nature of this case is two fold:

first,

Plaintiffs-Appellants1 action, as trustor, to invalidate
the trustee's sale of Plaintiffs-Appellants' real properties; and, second, the counterclaim of the DefendantRespondent Mid Valley., as purchaser of these real
properties at the trustee's sale, claiming their unlawful detainer by Plaintiffs-Appellants and, in addition,
requesting bond forfeiture pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P.
65A(c) for wrongful judicial restraint of Mid Valley's
possession of one of these properties.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs-Appellants'
Complaint was entered against Plaintiffs-Appellants
and in favor of Defendants-Respondents by the Hon.
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge, Third District Court.
Thereafter, the counterclaims of the DefendantRespondent Mid Valley were tried to the Hon. Stewart
M. Hanson, Sr., Judge, Third District Court.

Judge

Hanson, Sr., dismissed Mid Valley's counterclaims but
ordered Plaintiffs-Appellants to vacate that premises
(the 110 East commercial property) which they had retained in their possession, within 30 days of April 13,
1975, because the summary judgment against them ousted
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
them of
any possessory
rights, and ordered them to pay
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mid Valley $300.00 as they apparently had agreed to do
in a written agreement between the parties (Ex. I-d).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent Mid Valley seeks the
affirmance of Judge Hanson, Jr.'s, entry of summary
judgment and with it the affirmance of Judge Hanson,
Sr.'s, corollary order that Plaintiffs-Appellants vacate
the 11th East commercial property within 30 days of
April 13, 1975.
Defendant-Respondent Mid Valley further seeks
partial reversal of Judge Hanson, Sr.'s, judgment
dismissing two of Mid Valley's counterclaims:

first,

Mid Valley's counterclaim of unlawful detainer of the
11th East commercial property; and, second, Mid
Valley's counterclaim for bond forfeiture pursuant to
UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c).

Upon reversal of the judgment

dismissing these counterclaims, Mid Valley seeks the
entry of a corresponding judgment in its favor and
against the Plaintiffs-Appellants to the following
effect:

that Plaintiffs-Appellants were in unlawful

detainer of the 11th East commercial property for a
period of 20 days and that Mid Valley recover $660.00
from Plaintiffs-Appellants constituting damages, trebled,
resulting from this unlawful detainer; and that
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Rule 65A(c) bond in the amount

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

of $300.00 be forfeited to Mid Valley,

In. the alternative,

the Defendant-Respondent Mid Valley seeks partial
vacation of Judge Hanson, Sr.'s, judgment in the respects
described above, and remand to the lower court for a
determination of the damage

suffered by Mid Valley.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The following material facts are in addition

to those of Plaintiff-Appellants

fact statement:

During a long period preceding

at the time

of, and immediately following the disputed trustee's
sale, the Anderson's were represented by legal counsel
who advised them on matters regarding the sale. See,
reference to stipulation of counsel on postponement of
sale, at R 40; Affidavit of James B. Mason, at R 48,
to the effect that he spoke with Anderson's counsel
before accepting Mid Valley's payment for the properties; Affidavits of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, at R
60-61, David Doxey, at R 65, Austin Belnap, at R 67,
Helen and Ross Broadbent, at R 70, all to the effect
that Anderson's counsel conferred and advised on
various aspects of the sale.
The Andersons were acquainted with the
mechanics, operation and effect of default notices
and a trustee's sale, having brought and subse-

-4-
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quently having dismissed with prejudice an action
challenging the default notices and proposed
trustee's sale which preceded the presently disputed
notice and sale.

Anderson v. Cape Trust Co*, Civil

No. 223415, Third District Court, Salt Lake County
(order and dismissal of this case are found at R 40-42) •
The notice of the now-disputed January 16,
1975, sale gave the correct time and place of the sale.
R 52. The Andersons failed to attend because Mr.
Anderson was told the wrong place by Mrs. Anderson.
Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 78.
The purchaser at the sale, Mid Valley Investment, was a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice, having learned of the sale through official
means, having paid value and having no notice of
infirmity of the sale.

Affidavit of Ross and Helen

Broadbent, at R 69.
On the morning following the sale, the
trustee was advised by the Andersons1 counsel that a
trustee's deed should be issued to Mid Valley since
the Andersons still did not have the money to tender.
Affidavit of James B. Mason, at R 48. Mid Valley
paid for the properties by cashier's check and recorded their trustee's deed within 24 hours of the
sale.

Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent at R 70.
On the afternoon of January 17, 19 75, the

day following the sale, Mid Valley's representatives
met with the Andersons and the Andersons' counsel in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the counsel's office.

There the Andersons, either

personally or through their counsel, offered to
repurchase the property from Mid Valley.

Affidavit

of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, at R 60; Affidavit of
Ross and Helen Broadbent, at R 70; cf., Testimony
of Mr. Anderson, at R 19 4 (which testimony, however,
was not before the court when summary judgment was
granted and cannot here be considered in reviewing
the summaryjudgment determination). After Mid
Valley rejected this offer, the parties validly
entered into a rental, lease or occupancy agreement covering the Anderson properties.

Defendant's

Exhibit I-d and R 24; Amended Findings of Fact No. 2,
at R 143; see, Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent,
at R 60; Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at
R 71; Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 77-78.
This agreement, drawn in the hand of the Andersons1
counsel, required the Andersons to vacate the 11th
East commercial property by January 31, 19 75, and to
pay $150 a month rent for the 12th Avenue home until
April 17, 19 75, at which time they were also to vacate
this property.

Defendant's Exhibit I-d and R 24.

In respect of the 12th Avenue home, the
Andersons paid to Mid Valley $150.00 covering the
rent from January 18 to February 18, 1975.

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at R 71.
Thereafter they failed to pay anything further and
they remain in possession of the home by virtue of a
bond staying Judge Hanson, Sr.'s order that they
vacate the premises within 30 days of April 13, 1975.
In respect of the 11th East commercial property/ the Andersons failed to vacate the premises on
January 31, 19 75, as specified by their written agreement.

Instead, they negotiated with Mid Valley for

additional time (Testimony of Ross Broadbent, at
R 178-80) and then, on February 10, 1975, obtained
a temporary restraining order preventing, among other
things, the removal of their possessions from these
commercial premises pending a hearing.

R 10-11.

At this time, the Andersons posted a $300 bond pursuant
to UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c).
No. 9, at R 144.

Amended Findings of Fact

This order was superseded by the

court's further order, in the nature of a preliminary
injunction, issued February 18, 19 75.

R 13-14.

This

superseding order continued the Anderson's in possession of their former office in the 11th East commercial property during the pendency of the litigation,
"upon the posting and filing by the Plaintiffs [-Appellants]
of a $7,500 corporate or cash bond."
dersons never posted this bond.

-7-

Id.

The An-

Instead, their per-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sonal property remained on the premises until the
first week in March, 1975, at which tine they
vacated the premises.

Amended Findings of Fact

No. 9, at R 144. While the Andersons remained
in possession of their office in the 11th East
commercial property between February 1 and the
first week in March, 19 75, their only access to the
office was through Mid Valley which had changed the
locks and by arrangement with Anderson's counsel,
would allow access to the office only to remove the
Andersonfs personal property or to conduct business
in presence of a representative from Mid Valley.

Id.

About one week after the Andersons vacated the
office premises, Mid Valley rented them for $310.00
a month.

Testimony of Ross Broadbent, at R 181. At

the time Mid Valley moved for summary judgment, it

i
I

also moved for bond forfeiture pursuant to UTAH R.
CIV. P. 65A(c), and filed an affidavit showing its
attorney^ fees incurred in defending against the
temporary restraining order.
B.

R 44.

The Plaintiff-Appellant's Statements of

Fact are Inconsistent with the Facts or Inaccurate in
the Following Respects:
Plaintiffs-Appellants state that the total

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i
i
l
i
I
i

appraised value of their properties was approximately
$179,000.00 P-App. Brief," at 4.

This figure arises

from Mr. Anderson's Affidavit, R 80, which states that
it is derived from two attached appraisals.

Id. How-

ever, the attached appraisals or, more accurately,
value findings, are $9 8,950.00 for the 11th East commercial property and $65,950.00 for the 12th Avenue
home ("plus $5,000" for refrigerated airconditioning
if installed, but which, concededly was never installed).
(Value Findings are found in the record between pages 99
and 100.)

This totals only $164,900.00. Furthermore,

these "appraisals" are based on unsworn documents and
appear contradicted by Plaintiff-Appellants own brief.
Compare, P.-App. Brief, at 4 with P.App. Brief, at 24
(e.g., at 24, "no appraisal was had on the home....").
It may also be noted that the "appraisal" of the 11th
East commercial property states that the "value is
mostly in the land" and gives the size as 100 x 135
when, as may be seen from Plaintiffs-Appellants1 own
complaint, at R 2, the actual size of the property is
76.5 x 130.

Plaintiffs-Appellants correctly state Mid

Valley's purchase price as $36,750, but omit to state
that Mid Valley took title subject to substantial first
mortgages and judgments the total amount of which does
not appear from the record.

Trustee's deed, at R 51;

(Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at R 69 (as to
judgments); Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, .
at R Digitized
61 (as
to first mortgages).
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
-9-

Plaintiffs-Appellants state that, after the
sale, Mr. Anderson met an officer of Mid Valley,
Merlin Hanks, who made certain representations.
Brief, at 6.

P-App.

Mr. Hanks is, in fact, an officer of

Capitol Thrift.

Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 78.

Plaintiffs-Appellants state that Capitol
Thrift refused to accept "bids" from Belnap, Doxey,
Hill and Nelson.

P-App. Brief, e.g. at 7.

In fact,

none of these individuals attended the sale or sent
a bid to the sale.

E.g., P.-App. Brief, at 5. Bel-

nap and Doxey never implied that they would put up
money for the purchase but only that they "might be
interested."

Affidavit of David W. Doxey, at R 65. They

later concluded that in view of the "perhaps exaggerated values imputed to the properties," their "margin
seemed too thin" and they should make no attempt to
purchase the property.

Id.

Hill never contacted

the trustee and only contacted the beneficiary the day
after the sale.

Affidavit of Larry Hill, at R 88.

Nelson's cryptic and unsworn statement (to which the
lower court was not required to give weight) implies
only that the beneficiary Capitol Thrift still was
willing to allow the Andersons to redeem their default
if they could do so with Nelson's help before the time
of the sale.

No bid to buy the property is stated.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Unsworn statement of Barbara M. Nelson,*at R 87.
The foregoing discrepancies between the
factual characterization found in Plaintiffs-Appellants1
Brief and the factual characterization found here are decisively resolved by resort to the record and, in any
event, create no genuine issue as to any material fact
as may be seen from the following Argument,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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.THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE TO THE PRESENT FACTS AND LAW
The validity of the present trustee's sale,
reflecting the daily occurrence of similar sales under
analogous circumstances, is a proper subject for summary judgment.

Such a judgment promotes judicial

economy while preserving the integrity of the courts
and of the statutorily delimited trustees1 sales.
Where the law and the material facts are clear, a failure to grant summary judgment would be a harsh thing.
See,

e.g. , Burningham v. Ott, 525 P. 2d 620

(Utah 19 74) (majority and concurring opinions) .
For reasons of fact and law which follow, those
facts which are disputed by Plaintiffs-Appellants are
immaterial and summary judgment should be sustained.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS- APPELLANTS, NOT HAVING DONE EQUITY,
WERE NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF
The Andersons sought in the trial court the
equitable relief of invalidating the trustee's sale.
They were not entitled to this relief as a matter of
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law because they failed to do equity.

E.g., 30 C.J.S.

Equity §90(1965).
In the present circumstance, this rule requires
the Andersons to do equity by tendering the full payment
for the property to the trustee before they could properly seek invalidation of the sale.

This rule makes

sense since (1) invalidation without tender would
leave the trustee and beneficiary with no satisfaction
of the debt owed and, (2) unless the trustor could tender, he could not successfully bid at the sale in any
event, and, therefore, would most probably not be injured by the sale.
This rule is well established in those jurisdictions which have considered the question.

E.g.,

30

trustor challenged a sale pursuant to a trust deed as

i
i

having been irregular, the California court held, in the

I

C.J.S.

Equity §92 nn. 74.35 and 74.40 (1965), and cases

cited. California is such a jurisdiction.

Thus, where a

alternative, that since the trustor did not tender the

i
l

full amount due,

even if the sale should be regarded as voidable,
nevertheless, Plaintiff is in no event entitled
to have the same set aside through her own
complete failure to offer to do equity. In
j
the case of Leonard v. Bank, 16 Cal. App. 2d
I
at
page 346, 60 P.2d at page 328:
1
[I]f the said sale be for any reason treated
as voidable, nevertheless Plaintiff is in no
event entitled to have the same set aside
through her own complete failure to do equity.'
Mack v. Golino
' 213 P.2d 760, 762 (Cal. App. 1950)

i
l

And in Py v. Pleitner, 161 P.2d 393, 396 (Cal. App. 1945),
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

the court said:

"The rule in this state is settled

that a tender of the indebtedness is a prerequisite
to a judgment canceling a sale under a trust deed."
The general question as to what constitutes
a tender is well discussed by courts and commentators
and allows of a many-faceted answer.

E.g., 74 AM. JUR. 2d

Tender (1974), and cases cited; . 86 C.J.S. Tender (1954).
However, one conclusion is clear from the treatises cited:
the tender must, at the very minimum, be backed up by a
good faith ability to pay actual value.

Thus, in Hyams v.

Bamburger, 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 302 (1894) , this court noted
that ordinarily a tender requires the actual production of
the money to the creditors. Even where a statute requires
less than that (as the since repealed Utah Statute once
did, UTAH CODE ANN § 104-54-8 [1943]) the party tendering was required to "have the ability to produce [the
money],11 and to "act in good faith."

Id. , 36 P. at

203 (dictum) . Cf. , Lilenquist v. Utah State Nat. Bank,
99 Utah 163, 100 P.2d 185 (1940); LeVine v. Whitehouse,
37 Utah 228, 109 P. 2 (1910).
In the present case, the actions of Belnap,
Doxey and Hill do not amount to a tender for the Andersons since, at most, these men were interested only in
discussing or considering the purchase of the property
for themselves (which interest never crystallized).
Affidavit of David W. Doxey, at R 65; Affidavit of Austin
Belnap, at R 67; Affidavit of Larry Hill, at R 88-89.
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The affidavits of the Andersons state that they
are "willing" to pay Defendants-Respondents the money they
"owe" and that this statement "constitutes an official
tender of money owed."

Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at

R 81; Affidavit of Mrs. Anderson, at R 86.

This statement

is ambiguous as to whether the Andersons intended thereby
to bring their payments current (which, coming as it did
after the three month redemption period, was patently
insufficient) or to pay the sale price of the properties.
Furthermore, this statement is backed by no showing of a
good faith ability to pay.

It is instead backed by a

record of many months of default and inability on the
i

part of the Andersons to pay their notes to Capitol

^

Thrift.

(

Under such circumstances, the Andersons have

made no tender.

As the California appellate court

stated in Security-First Nat. Bank v. Cryer,

37 Cal.

'
1

App. 2d 657, 104 P.2d 66,69 (1940):

l

Surely it cannot be said that upon a trustee's
sale under a deed of trust the auctioneer is required to accept any bid that is made, irrespective of whether the amount of the bid is proI
duced and where no information is forthcoming as
. .• . "
to the financial ability of the bidder. If this
were true, any debtor could attend a foreclosure
sale of his property and make any bid he cared to,
without any intention of actually paying the amount:
of his bid. The sale then of course, would ahve
to be held all over again, new notices gotten out,
etc. If such a procedure were permitted and
carried to its possible ultimate conclusion, any
foreclosure sale could be prevented indefinitely.
I
Further, it must be remembered in the instant case
*
that it was necessary to foreclose the two deeds of
the trust because the trustor, Mr. Cryer, had defaulted
in his payments upon the notes they secured. Was not
the trustee's agent at the sale warranted therefore, in
assuming that if Mr. Cryer were financially responsible
he would not in the first place have allowed the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
i

I
i

think so. And indeed, as heretofore pointed out,
at no time during the proceedings- now under review
was any attempt made -to assert the financial ability
of appellant Cryer to pay in cash the amount of
the bids he proffered.
Without a more substantial "tender" by the Andersons,
equitable relief if granted by the lower court would reinstate the Andersons1 still-uncured defaults, an inequitable and unsatisfactory result contravening the
weight of authority.
Under these circumstances, the lower court
was justified in determining as a matter of law that
Plaintiffs-Appellants, not having done equity, were
not entitled to equity and summary judgment should have
been entered, as it was.

POINT III
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS RATIFIED THE DISPUTED SALE
AND THEREBY WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO CHALLENGE IT
Trustors ratify a trustee's sale and waive
any right to challenge it if they, with knowledge of the
material circumstances, subsequently offer to repurchase
the property or begin renting the property or take other
action inconsistent with a claim of title.

While there

appears to be no Utah case law on this point as it
touches trustee's sales, the principle is well established
generally.

See, e.g., 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §601 at 1051

(1949); see, especially, Denson v. Davis, 256 N.C.
658, 124 So. E. 2d 827, 831 (1962) (collecting cases)
(a trustor who rents or seeks to purchase from purchaser
Digitized
by the Howard W. sale).
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
ratifies
voidable
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the present circumstance, the Andersons
stipulated that the disputed sale could be conducted
(R 40-42) and then, by their counsel, instructed the
trustee to consummate the sale and issue a trustee's
deed to Mid Valley.

Affidavit of James B. Mason, at

R 48.
Thereafter, the Andersons offered to repurchase the properties in the presence of and with
the advice of counsel.

Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou

Broadbent, at R 60. Affidavit of Ross and Helen
Broadbent, at R 70.

(Note:

This repurchase offer is

amplified by the testimony of Mr. Anderson at the trial
of the counterclaims in this case.

However, that

testimony was not before the lower court at the summary
judgment hearing and is therefore not germane to this
discussion.)
When their repurchase offer was refused, the
Andersons entered into a formal rental agreement, drawn
by their own attorney and executed by all concerned,
and covering the Anderson properties.

Defendant's

Exhibit I-d and R 24; Amended Finding of Fact No. 4, at
R 14 3; see, Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at
R 71; Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, at R 60;
Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 77-78.

As a final,

conclusive gesture of ratification and waiver, the Ander
sons paid to Mid Valley the first month's rent due under
the rental agreement.

Affidavit of Ross and Helen

Broadbent, at R 71.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Andersons1. clear cut ratification of the
now-disputed sale constitutes a waiver of any right to
challenge it and, as a matter of law, again validates
the lower court's entry of summary judgment against them.
E.g., Denson v. Davis, supra.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT MID VALLEY WAS A BONA FIDE
PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE WHOSE
TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES CANNOT NOW BE INVALIDATED

Mid Valley was a bona fide purchaser of the
Anderson properties for value without notice.

This fact

was argued to the lower court, R 36, was unchallenged by
the Andersons in the lower court and is not now at issue.
The record

shows without contradiction that Mid Valley

purchased for value without actual or constructive notice
of any defect in the sale.

E.g., Affidavit of Ross and

Helen Broadbent, at R 69. As such a purchaser, Mid Valley's title to the properties is not now subject to
successful attack by the Andersons.
Under UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-28(1), the recitals
of statutory compliance in the trustee's deed, R 51, are
conclusive evidence thereof in favor of Mid Valley as a
bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

As a

result, the Andersons1 attack on the sale, as against Mid
Valley, simply fails, as a matter of law.
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Furthermore, the case law—in addition to the
conclusive Utah statute—strongly suggests that any
peccadillo (or larger transgression) committed by the
trustee in the course of the sale must be answered in
damages by the trustee and should not affect Mid Valley's
title.

In Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 190 P.

2d 135, 138-39 (1948) the Court announced the rule that
the beneficiary to a trust cannot reclaim trust property
(in that case real property) in the hands of a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice.
jJUR. 2d Trusts §269 (1975).

See, also, 76 AM.

In Webster v. Knop, 6 Utah

2d 273, 312 P.2d 557 (1957), the Court reiterated this
rule in the context of disputed mining claims.

See also,

e.g., Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122 (1888); Zier v.

.j

Osten, 135 Mont. 484, 342 P.2d 1076 (1959); Dodge v.
Stone, 76 R.I. 318, 69 A.2d 632 (1949).
By strict analogy this rule limits the trustor's
as well as the beneficiary's recourse to the property since
the trustor's legal right to the trust property after

i
]

his uncured default certainly does not exceed the inter-

i

est of the beneficiary.

|

Thus, when this Court considered

a motion to set aside a mortgage sale, it noted with care
that the motion preceded the expiration of the redemption
period and was part of the original foreclosure suit,
thereby establishing by implication that the vested title
of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice was
not affected by the motion.

Skeen v. Pratt, 8 7 Utah 121,
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i
i
i

i

48 P. 2d 457, 453 (1935) v
The effect of the rule, as adopted by other
states, is that the title of.a purchaser such as Mid
Valley cannot now be voided by the Andersons.
Donovan v. Frick, 458 S.W. 2d 282

E.g. ,

(Mo. 1970); Dugan v. Man-

chester Federal Savings & Loan Assn. , 92 N.H. 44, 23 A.
2d 873 (1942)? Pi Nola v. Allison, 143 Cal. 106, 76 P.
976 (1904); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §601a and n. 70 at 1051
(1949) .

Indeed, this Defendant-Respondent has found no

case whose facts reveal the invallidation of the vested
title of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
at a trustee's sale.

Instead, trustor's in the circum-

stance of the Andersons should look if at all, to the
trustee for relief in damages.
As a result, summary judgment in favor of Mid
Valley was correctly entered by the lower court.
POINT V .
THE DISPUTED TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS IN ALL
MATERIAL RESPECTS PROPERLY CONDUCTED
A - Defendant-Respondent Mid Valley's Payment
Within 24 Hours of the Sale was "forthwith" under
UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-28 and, in any Event, is not Subject to Challenge

by Plaintiffs-Appellants Who Were

Not Injured by Any Delay.
As the record shows without dispute, Mid
Valley, the only outside bidder, appeared at the January 16, 19 75, trustee's sale and placed the highest
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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bid, whereupon the properties were declared "sold11 to
Mid Valley.
46-48.

E.g. , Affidavit of James B. Mason, at R

Mid Valley and the trustee, having spoken

earlier on the subject, then agreed that full payment
could be made within 24 hours, which it was.

E.g., id.;

Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at R 69-70.

This

typical procedure in no way invalidates the sale since
the term "forthwith" in the context of UTAH CODE ANN.
§57-1-28 comprehends a reasonable, 24-hour opportunity
to pay if the trustee so allows.
A bidder cannot reasonably be expected to
carry cash or cashier's check in the exact amount needed
since the sum of the highest bid cannot be known in
advance.

Indeed, this fact is understood and anticipated

by UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-2 7 which allows the trustee to
resell the property following a sale in which the high
bidder could not or did not produce money in the amount
of his bid, taxing the added expense to that bidder.

If

I

the law anticipated instantaneous payment before the con-

requires the trustee to execute and deliver his deed "upon

i
i

the receipt of payment," suggesting some opportunity for

I

clusion of the auction sale, there would be little
need for the resale provision.

And UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-28

filling out the deed in an orderly fashion after the sale
and before money and deed change hands.

See, First

Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Sharp, 347 S.W.2d 337
(1961), rehearing denied, 359 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App. 1962)
(a cash sale is a sale concurrent with delivery of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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deed which delivery may follow the auction by hours or

i
I
I
__

days)•

*

The courts of other jurisdictions in interpreting sales statutes requiring payment "forthwith"
have recognized the practical wisdom in interpreting such
provisions to allow a reasonable time to produce the
money.

In Williams v. Continental Securities Corporation,

22 Wash. 1, 153 P.2d 847 (1944) the court in interpreting
the forthwith payment required by statute at a sheriff's
sale said:
In the instant case, it could not have been
expected that the parties interested in purchasing the property would have $33,000 or more
in their pockets at the place of sale; and,
since there was to be competitive bidding, no
one could tell just how much would be required
of the successful bidder. It was therefore
proper for the deputy sheriff to allow the
appellant, as the highest bidder, a reasonable
time to produce the amount of his bid. What
was a reasonable time would necessarily depend
upon the circumstances.
Id., 153 P.2d at 854.
In accord are Minnesota Debenture Co. v. Scott, 106
Minn. 32, 119 N.W. 391 (1908); Leavitt v. S.D. Mercer Co.,
64 Neb. 31, 89 N.W. 426 (1902).
In determining the limits of a "reasonable time"
for payment, the courts have affirmed the judgment of the
trustee or sheriff unless obviously unreasonable.

Thus,

in Williams v. Continental Securities, supra, where the
sheriff decided to wait less than one hour for payment,
the court sustained the sheriff, noting that he is vested
with powers to evaluate bids and to allow a reasonable
time to make the bid good.

153 P.2d at 855.

The court

added, Digitized
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tending into the next day, might also be reasonable
under proper circumstances.

153 P.2d at 854; see,

Minnesota Debenture v. Scott, supra (payment the day
following sale allowed).

It is additionally noted that

a trustee1s judgment as to the payment time affects only
the creditor-beneficiary and may well be flexible within
the requirements of the creditor-beneficiary, while the
sheriff1s judgment may be fettered by the state's interest in receiving its tax lien revenue, or etc.
In the present circumstance, the trustee,
after conferring with the bidder (R 59,69), determined
that a reasonable time acceptable to the creditorbeneficiary in which to allow an out-of-town bidder to
make its payment would at least encompass 24 hours (the
actual payment time).

In the instant case, this is not

as a matter of law an unreasonably long period of time
to allow payment and is consistent with the statutory
requirement of "forthwith" payment.
A review of Plaintiffs-Appellants' citations
on the question of "forthwith" payment leaves the foregoing conclusion unrebutted.
In P-App. Brief, at 13, the Andersons quote
(actually paraphrase) Application of County Collector,
266 N.E.2d 383, 387 (111. App. 1970) to the effect that
the term "forthwith" as used in the Illinois Revenue Act
to describe payment at a tax sale "means that purchaser
at a tax sale must make payment on date of sale." However, as noted above, the interest by the state in imDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mediate payment at tax sales is not present in the in-

stant case. More importantly, perhaps, the court in
County.Collector reached its result "in accord with the
reasoning and result of Hoffmann v. Stuckslager." 266
N.E.2d at 387. The Hoffman case, which like County
Collector was the product of an Illinois intermediate
appeals court, was reversed by the Illinois Supreme
Court and with it the "reasoning and result" of the
County Collector case was overturned.

Hoffman v.

Stuckslager, 48 111.2d 262,269 N.E.2d 501 (1971).

The

Illinois Supreme Court first cited Illinois precedents
to the effect that "forthwith" implies a reasonable time
for payment, then rejected these precedents since the
Illinois Revenue Act has now been amended td require the
tax sales price to be "paid in cash at the time of sale."
269 N.E.2d at 504. The court next reversed Stucklager
stating:
So far as an owner of delinquent property is
concerned, it is sufficient to conclude...
that the provisions for payment are directory
and do not afford a basis for an attack upon the
validity of the sale.
269 N.E.2d at 504.
Thus, in Illinois, "forthwith" when coupled with the
phrase "paid in cash at the time of sale" means immediate
payment but is directory so far as a property owner is
concerned and affords no basis for an attack upon the
validity of the sale.
Each of the Andersons1 other citations to the
effect that "forthwith" means "immediate" deal with
circumstances distantly related to the present.
Dettmer
v. Mayo, 61 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1952) P-App. Brief, at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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13/ (prisoner delivered by sheriff from jail to prison
after a three-month delay is not "forthwith"); Bottle
Mining and Milling Co, v, Kern, 9 Cal. App. 527, 99 P.
994 (1908), P-App. Brief, at 14, (notice of assessment
of corporate shares sufficient if given upon the making
of corporate resolution); Lewis v. Hojer, 16 N.Y.S. 534
(Comm. Pleas 1891), P-App. Brief, at 14, (19 days is
reasonable time to ship cigars from Florida to New
York); Sheldon v. Steele, 114 Iowa 616, 87 N.W. 683
(1901), P-App. Brief, at 14, (suit by County Treasurer
against alleged property purchaser; payment delay from
December 6, to last of December not "forthwith").

The

decision in Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 80 Ariz. 368, 298
P.2d 789 (1956), ("forthwith" docket entries should be
immediate) relied on by the Andersons, P-App. Brief, at
14, was altered dramatically on rehearing, 81 Ariz. 104,
301 P.2d 757 (1956) (docket entry made one or two days
after court's order constitutes a valid starting date
from which the time of appeal runs).
The foregoing citations by the Andersons lend
no weight to their argument.

Payment by Mid Valley was

"forthwith" within the intent and meaning of the Statute.
Finally, even if Mid Valley's payment had not
been "forthwith," this would not constitute an irregularity
about which the Andersons could complain.
Stuckslager, Supra, 269 N.E.2d at 504.

Hoffman v.

The statutory pro-

vision is for the benefit of the creditor-beneficiary according to authority from other jurisdictions and a payDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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an owner in default.

See, id. ; cf. , Py v. Pleitner,

161 P.2d 393 (Cal. App. 1945) (trustee may even accept
a note from highest bidder in lieu of cash); Admiral
Co. v. ' Thomas, 164 F. Supp* 569 (D.D.C. 1958) ; Smith v.
Deeson, 14 So. 40 (Miss. 1893) 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §576b(2)
at 971 (provisions for cash sale benefit the creditor
[or beneficiary] enabling him to have his money
speedily and an agreement to postpone payment gives
the mortgagor [or trustor] no right to complain);

§579

at 9 82 (19 49) (statutory requirement of cash deposit
by highest bidder at the time of sale may also be
waived by trustee or officer).
B - The Disputed Sale Occurred on the Date
Noticed.

It was not Unlawfully Postponed.
The Andersons argue that there exists a dis-

pute as to whether the sale was postponed from noon
January 16, to the forenoon of January 17, 19 75, when
Mid Valley paid for the properties.
There exists no contradiction in the record as
to when the sale was noticed and held.

The single, and

not unusual fact that Mid Valley paid almost 24 hours
later creates no genuine issue as to the date of the
sale in light of the legitimacy of that payment as
argued in the foregoing section.
Furthermore, the trustee's deed to Mid Valley
(R 50-51) affirmatively recites that the sale was proper
in respect of notice and other areas of compliance with
the applicable statute.

Under UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-28(1),
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which, as evidenced by the Broadbent affidavits (R 58,69)
and as conclusively established by the absence of any
argument to the contrary in the lower court, is a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice. Therefore,
there exists no material or genuine issue as to whether
the sale was properly held without postponement.
C - Notice Requiring Cash Payment at the Time
of Sale Neither Invalidates the Sale nor Renders it Unfair.
Plaintiffs-Appellants assert the invalidity or
unfairness of the disputed sale because the sale notice
said the sale would be for cash when, in fact, Mid
Valley was allowed to make payment the morning following
the sale.

P-App. Brief at 16-23.

The unfairness arises,

according to the Andersons, because:

the trustee's

cash-only notice discouraged potential bidders who could
not pay cash but who could have entered valid bids payable within 24 hours.

This argument does not withstand

scrutiny.
A cash sale is one in which cash is paid by
the time the deed is delivered which may occur well after
the sale.

A delay of a few days even will not be regarded

as extending credit.

First Federal Savings & Loan Assn.

v. Sharp, supra, 347 S.W.2d at 340, 341; 59 C.J.S.
Mortgages §576b (3) at 972 (1949).

Furthermore, a trustor

or mortgagor cannot complain if a beneficiary or creditor
who is entitled to cash allows instead extra time for payment since the cash sale provision of most trust and
mortgage documents is only for the benefit of the beneDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in the instant case may actually have benefitted the
Andersons as the following reasoning demonstrates.
At the time of the sale, the trustee agreed
to accept later payment from the high bidder, as well
he lawfully might.

See, POINT V

A supra; Hoffmann v.

Stuckslager, supra; Py v. Pleitner, supra; First
Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Sharp, supra; Admiral
Co. v. Thomas, supra; Smith v. Deeson, supra; cf.,
Hill v. Gibralter Savings & Loan Association, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 188, (Cal. App. 1967); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §576b (2),
(3) (1949). Under the instant facts, this resulted in no
dispersal of impatient cash bidders (as feared by the
Kleckner court) because the only other bidder present
was Capitol Thrift.

And the high bidder, Mid Valley,

actually made good on its bid by paying within the time
allowed by the trustee.

The effect is a net benefit to

the Andersons because the trustee, by allowing payment in
24 hours was able to accept and be paid the highest bid.
As a matter of law, there is no unfairness to
the Andersons.

Indeed, a ruling by this court to the

effect that trustees must require immediate cash payment if they post notice of a cash sale, would most
probably be to the detriment of trustors such as the
Andersons.

In such an event, the trustee would probably

continue to post a cash sale notice in order to conform
to the provisions of the customary trust agreement forms
and in order to avoid unwanted payment delays, and would
then, by the Andersons1 tortured reasoning, be obligated
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payment to the exclusion of all other, higher bids.
D

Respects.

~ The Disputed Sale was Fair in All Other
The sale of the Anderson properties was not

done in a corner.

The Andersons received the close ad-

vice of counsel at all stages as documented by the
Supplemental Statement of Facts.

Capitol Thrift and

the trustee worked for months with the Andersons in an
effort to help them cure their defaults—event to the
extent of stipulating to the cancellation of a scheduled
sale on the condition that the Andersons bring their
obligations current (which they, even then, failed to
do).

R 40-42.

Thereafter, Capitol Thrift entertained

numerous schemes and proposals of the Andersons to
cure their default, as shown by the Andersons1 affidavits,
even though the statutory period for redemption had long
since lapsed.

Now, the Andersons attack the sale claiming

that the very accommodations made by Capitol Thrift and
the trustee are grounds for voiding the sale.

Such a

result as that requested by the Andersons would not only
cool the cooperation of future trustees and beneficiaries,
but would be, as a matter of law, incorrect.
First, the Andersons argue that a Barbara M.
Nelson made an "offer to pay Plaintiffs1 findebtedness'"
on the morning of January 16, 1975.

In the first place,

this statement in the affidavit of Mrs. Anderson is
totally devoid of any suggestion as to her competence
to testify on this point.

R 84. The only suggestion

as to her source for this information is the unsworn
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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statement of Mrs. Nelson.

R 87. UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e)

requires that affidavits opposing summary judgment "shall
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein."

Mrs. Anderson's affi-

davit meets none of these prerequisites and Mrs. Nelson's
unsworn statement fails of even threshold admissibility.
Where an insufficient affidavit is not the subject of a
motion to strike, a party may not complain on appeal that
it was improperly considered by the court.

Howick v.

Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 352 (1972).
If*the rule were otherwise, judicial economy would be
undermined.

However, the lower court may and should

ignore insufficient affidavits regardless of any motion
to strike and, when it does so, the appellate court
should not disturb its proper decision.

Preston v. Lamb,

20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1968) ("...the trial
judge would not be reversed in ignoring [an inadmissible
part of an affidavit] even if it tended to support the
allegations of Plaintiff's complaint...."); 6 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1(56.22 [1] at 2803 and n. 17, at 281719 (1974 and 1974 Supp. at n.17).

If the rule were other

wise, judicial economy would be undermined.

Thus the

lower court was justified in entering summary judgment
without regard to these materials.

Furthermore, this

alleged offer is at most ambiguous as to whether a
. tardy "cure" of default or a property purchase was inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Andersons no longer had a statutory right to redeem and any accommodating redemption attempt allowed by
Capitol Thrift and the trustee would have to be immediate to avoid another postponement of the sale. Finally , this alleged offer was communicated to Capitol
Thrift who at that late date had no legal or equitable
obligation to accommodate the Andersons,

The trustee,

who is charged with conducting a fair sale, never received this alleged offer at all, so far as the record
shows.

No unfairness results from this alleged occur-

rence.
Second, the Andersons argue that Capitol
Thrift agreed on January 9, 1975, to allow them to cure
their default.

Affidavit of Mrs. Anderson, ± R 84-85.

Once again, Capitol Thrift was under no legal or equitable obligation to allow cure, the trustee was not
involved and no money changed hands.

Furthermore, the

Andersons can hardly be heard to say that they were not
aware that the sale was being held, in any event, since
they were advised by their own attorney on the point.
Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 78. Under these circumstances, no unfairness occurred.
Third, the Andersons propose that they were
disadvantaged because Hill, Doxey and Belnap were not
allowed to bid on the properties.

However, Hill never

contacted the trustee and only contacted Capitol Thrift
the day after the sale.
sale.

He made no appearance at the

Affidavit of Larry Hill at R 88-89.

Doxey and

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Capitol Thrift with regard to any aspect of the sale.
Doxey and Belnap simply decided on their own not to
get involved.

Affidavit of David W. Doxey, at R 65.

Affidavit of H. Austin Belnap, at R 67.
In light of the foregoing, the claim that
the sale price obtained for the property was depressed
by the conduct of Capitol Thrift and the trustee fails .
as a matter of law.

It is additionally noted that no

genuine factual issue as to the adequacy of the sale
price was raised by the Andersons before the lower court.
There is no dispute as to the value of the properties,
except as the Andersons.dispute it among themselves
based on unsworn "value findings" and hearsay.

Compare

P-App. Brief, at 24, with P.App. Brief, at 4.

There is

also no dispute as to the price paid by Mid Valley, or
to the fact that they assumed first mortgages on the
property as well as unsatisfied judgments.
deed, at R 51

Trustee's

Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent,

at R 73. Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, at
R 61. The Andersons simply failed to determine or allege
by affidavit the difference between the appraised value
of the properties and the price paid for the properties
by Mid Valley together with the amount of encumbrances
assumed.

Neither did the Andersons allege by affidavit

even generally a purchase price deficiency.
On balance, the lower court could properly
conclude, as a matter of law, that neither trustee norCapitol Thrift compromised the integrity of the sale by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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discouraging bids or by any other conduct.
E - I n any Event, the Alleged Sale Irregularities
are Insufficient to Affect the Sale.
A trustee's sale should not be disturbed for
light or trivial reasons.
487, 64 P. 848, 849 (1909).

Meux v. Trexvant, 132 Cal.
Indeed, fraud, collusion or

gross irregularity coupled with injury to the complainant must be affirmatively shown.
152

E.g., Brown v. Busch,

Cal. App. 2d 200, 313 P.2d 19 (1957); 59 C.J.S.

Mortgages §601b (1949); 55 AM. JUR. 2d, Mortgages
§§829, 831 (1971).

The difficulty of meeting this

burden is demonstrated by the fact that the disputed
sales were upheld in each of the cases cited by PlaintiffsAppellants for the proposition that gross inadequacy of
price coupled with some other irregularity constitutes
grounds for invalidation.

P. App. Brief, at 24-26;

Nevada Land and Mortgage Co. v. Hidden Wells Ranch, Inc.,
83 Nev. 501, 435 P.2d 198 (1968); Crofoot v. Tarman,
147 Cal. App. 2d 443, 305 P.2d 56 (1957); Foge v. Schmidt,
101 Cal. App. 681, 226 P.2d 73 (1951).

As seen from the

earlier discussion, Plaintiffs-Appellants make no supportable claim of fraud, collusion, gross irregularities or
mistake coupled with prejudice to them sufficient to
affect the disputed sale.

And, as seen from POINT IV,

above, Plaintiffs-Appellants can in no event disturb
Mid Valley's title to the properties by a showing of
irregularity which does not involve Mid Valley.
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POINT VI
CONCLUSION:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED

The trustee's sale disputed by PlaintiffsAppellants came only after many months of their default,
after the cancellation of one sale and after the entire
transaction had been scrutinized by their counsel.
The sale was held upon the stipulation of
Plaintiffs-Appellants that it might go forward.

It was

consummated by the issuance of a trustee's deed to Mid
Valley only after counsel to Plaintiffs-Appellants advised the trustee to do so.

Thereafter, the Plaintiffs-

Appellants offered to repurchase the properties from
Mid Valley and, upon refusal of the offer, entered into
an agreement to rent the properties from Mid Valley,
paying the first month's rent.

Therefore, Plaintiffs-

Appellants ratified the sale and waived any right to
challenge it.

-

Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to do equity by
a valid tender of purchase price of the properties and,
therefore, were foreclosed from the equitable relief
they sought.

*

Mid Valley is a bona-fide purchaser for value
without notice against whom the sale cannot be invalidated.
The

disputed facts claimed by Plaintiffs-Appel-

lants as material are immaterial because they do not
concern cognizable sale irregularities and because, as
a matter of law, summary judgment was properly granted
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Therefore, the lower court's entry of Summary
Judgment should be affirmed.
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THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED MID VALLEY'S
COUNTERCLAIMS RESPECTING UNLAWFUL DETAINER OF THE
11th EAST COMMERCIAL PROPERTY AND BOND FORFEITURE
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ANDERSONS WERE IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER OF THE
11th EAST COMMERCIAL PROPERTY
A - Under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-36-3(1) No Notice
was Required to Create the Circumstance of Unlawful
Detainer and Amended Conclusion of Law 3 is Erroneous,
The evidence at trial was undisputed that the
Andersons and Mid Valley executed Exhibit I-d.
Findings of Fact No. 4, at R 143.

Amended

The document is in

the handwriting of Andersons1 counsel who advised them
with regard to it.

R 174-76.

The document is clearly

binding on the parties.
With regard to the 11th East commercial property
the document provided for a two-week term of occupancy for
the Andersons, that term to conclude January 31, 19 75.
In view of the entry of summary judgment against the
Andersons on the question of property ownership, the
conclusion seems clear that during this two week period,
the Andersons were tenants of Mid Valley for a specific
term.

As to the unlawful detainer of tenants for a

specific term, UTAH CODE ANN. §78-36-3(1) provides:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by
tenant for term less than life.—.
A tenant of real property, for a term less
than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(1) When he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, of the property or any part
thereof, after the expiration of the term for
which it is let to him. In all cases where
real property is leased for a specified term
or period, the tenancy shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of such specified
term or period;
By the clear meaning of the statute, no notice
was required to place the Andersons in unlawful detainer.
Although no Utah cases construing this provision have
been found, cases in other jurisdictions support the
principle that no notice to a tenant for a specific term
is required to establish unlawful detainer.

E.g., Smith

v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113 (1935); Beach
Realty Co. v. City, 105 N.J.L. 317, 144 A.720 (1929);
Annot., 64 A.L.R. 304 (1929); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 212
(1935).
That Mid Valley neither by action nor aquiescence
implied the continuation of the Andersons1 tenancy, is
clear from the record.

R 178-81.

That a tenancy at will

does not automatically obtain at the end of a lease for
a specific term is clear from the statute and the cases.
Thus the court's conclusion that notice was defective
is erroneous.
B - The Andersons' Continued Possession of the
11th East Commercial Property was Authorized by Restraining Order for a Period of Eight Days Only.

Amended Con-

clusion of Law 4, and Amended Findings of Fact 7 and 8
are in Part Erroneous.
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The facts are that the Andersons retained pos-

session of the 11th East commercial property after
January 31, 1975, by their failure to remove their
belongings from the premises until the first week in
March, 19 75.

Amended Finding of Fact No. 9.

Amended

Conclusion of Law No. 2 to the effect that the Andersons continued to hold possession of the premises has
not been appealed from and is supported by the case law.
E.g., Cohen v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816
(Cal. App. 1967) (Failure of real parties in interest
to remove their equipment from premises "may constitute
a holding over which deprives the landlord of his right
to possession.").

This continued possession lasted for

more than a month but was authorized by court order
for an eight day period only.
The lower court's injunctive orders are in the
record and speak for themselves.

R 10-11, 13-14.

The

initial temporary restraining order affecting the 11th
East commercial property was dated February 10, 1975.
It expired by law no longer than ten days after issuance
and, in this case, eight days after issuance since it
was then, on February 18, 19 75, superseded by the court's
further order.

The court's further order (in the nature

of a preliminary injunction) did not make "permanent" the
initial temporary restraining order.

In the first

place, by its terms the new order was, at most, pendente
lite.

More importantly, the new order, sofar as it en-

joined Mid Valley was made to "take effect upon the posting and filing by the Plaintiffs of a $7,500.00 corporDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ate or cash bond

"

R 13-14.

This bond was

never posted or filed and the new order, by its own
terms, never took effect.

Amended Finding of Fact No.

9, R 144.
Therefore, prior to February 10, 1975, and
following February 18, 19 75, there was neither a temporary restraining order nor preliminary injunction nor
any other judicial restraint which would protect the
Andersons from unlawful detainer status.
C — Neither the Andersons' Honest Belief That
They Owned the 11th East Commercial Property, Nor Their
Litigation of That Question Protects the Andersons From
Unlawful Detainer Status.

Amended Conclusions of Law

1 and 2 are erroneous.
Amended Conclusions of Law 1 and 2 and Paragraph
of the lower court's Memorandum Decision, R 10 3, suggest
that unlawful detainer is unavailable to Mid Valley because the Andersons were in good faith litigating the
question of ownership of the 11th East commercial property.
This reasoning is unsupported in law and would lead to
the untoward conclusion that any tenant, by making a claim,
counterclaim or defense against his landlord, could automatically minimize his exposure to an unlawful detainer
action.
It has long since been established in this
State that unlawful detainer is available to the vendor
of real property against the vendee (circumstances
closely analogous to the present).

E.g., Forrester v.

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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litigation by the vendor against the vendee for unlawful detainer, the vendee will most often defend on the
ground that his possession is lawful.
case in Cook,

Such was the

This Court has never held such a good

faith, but unsuccessful, defense to preclude a finding
of unlawful detainer.
Indeed, in the controlling case of Tanner v.
Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, rehearing granted,
6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957), the Court held
squarely that unlawful detainer was available to the
prevailing party despite a defendant's unsuccessful
claim of ownership.

There Tanner claimed ownership of

the property by virtue of his redemption of it from a
sheriff's sale.

A defendant and counterclaimant Reichert

also claimed ownership of the property, establishing that
he had received an assignment of the sheriff's certificate of sale from the original purchaser at the sheriff's
sale.

Ultimately, the Court declared Tanner the owner

of the property and held Reichert to be in unlawful detainer (through his tenant) for a substantial period before judgment.

In so holding, the Court said at 305 P.2d

at 887:
[A] person appearing in this kind of case and
asserting that the actual occupant is rightfully
in possession as his tenant will be subject to a
personal judgment against him for treble damages
if the court decides his claim is invalid.
(Footnote omitted.)
In view of the foregoing, the Andersons' good
faith litigation of the question of title to the 11th,
East commercial property does not affect their unlawful
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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detainer status and the conclusions suggesting it does
are erroneous.
D - The Fair Rental Value of the 11th East
Commercial Property was $310.00 a month.
Mid Valley's agent Ross Broadbent testified
without contradiction that about one week after the
Andersons voluntarily vacated the 11th East commercial
property (the first week in March), Mid Valley rented
the premises for $310.00 a month.

R 181. Mr. Broadbent

further testified that, in his experience, this was a
fair rental value.

R 181-82.

And, in any event, an

owner is competent to testify as to the value of his
property.

In the absence of any testimony or evidence

to the contrary, this evidence is sufficient to establish
conclusively the fair rental value of the premises.
This fair rental value may be used in computing treble
damages in the present circumstance where no rent is
specified in the occupancy agreement.

See, Forrester

v. Cook, Supra, 292 P. at 214.
E - Mid Valley is Entitled to Damages for Unlawful Detainer in the Amount of $660.00.
The Andersons1 possession of the 11th East
commercial property constituted unlawful detainer from
the date of the termination of the occupancy agreement,
January 31, 19 75, until the first week in March, 19 75,
less the eight days during which the temporary restraining order protected the Andersons in their possession
of the premises.

Since the fair market value of the

premises is $310.00 a month, or approximately $11.00 for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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each day in February, and since the Andersons were in
unlawful detainer for 20 days, they are liable to Mid
Valley in the sum of $220•00 which trebled is $660.00.
POINT II
AMENDED CONCLUSION OF LAW 7 IS ERRONEOUS
AND THE ANDERSONS SHOULD FORFEIT THEIR $300.00 BOND
TO MID VALLEY
On February 10f 19 75, a temporary restraining
order was signed against Mid Valley enjoining it from
occupying the 11th East commercial property.

Pursuant

to this order, the Andersons, as their own sureties,
posted bond in the amount of $300.00. Amended Findings
of Fact No. 9, at R 144.

This order remained in effect

until February 18, 19 75.
For the reasons cited above in support of the
entry of summary judgment by the lower court in favor
of Mid Valley, Mid Valley was at all relevant times
rightfully entitled to occupy the 11th East commercial
property and the temporary restraining order operated
as a wrongful restraint upon it.

Therefore, pursuant

to UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c), Mid Valley is entitled to
forfeiture in its favor of the Andersonsf bond in the
amount of its resulting injury.
Attorneys1 fees incurred as a result of the
wrongful restraint amount to more than the amount of the
bond as shown by the affidavit of Ralph R. Mabey.

R 44.

Because Rule 6 5A(c) instructs Mid Valley to seek bond
forfeiture
upon
the J.affidavit
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pursuant to Mid Valley's motion for bond forfeiture is
competent.

UTAH R. CIV. P. 43 (e). Furthermore, the

attorneys1 fees established by the affidavit are
cognizable as injury to Mid Valley resulting from the
wrongful restraint.

E.g., Coggins

v. Wright, 22 Ariz.

App. 217, 526 P.2d 741, 743 (1974) (well recognized that
attorney's fees required for procuring dissolution of
wrongful injunction constitute recoverable damages);
Annot.r 55 A.L.R. 454 (1928).
In addition to its attorneys' fees, Mid Valley
was injured by the wrongful restraint in the amount of
the daily rental value of the premises times eight days.
The daily rental value, deduced from the foregoing
materials, is approximately $11.00.

Thus, Mid Valley

was damaged in the amount of $8 8.00 in lost rentals.
Since the amount of Mid Valley's injury resulting from the wrongful restraint exceeds the amount
of the bond, Mid Valley is entitled to forfeiture in its
favor of the entire $300.00 bond.
POINT III
CONCLUSION:

MID VALLEY IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES

AND BOND FORFEITURE IN ITS FAVOR
The lower court's refusal to declare the
Andersons in unlawful detainer of the 11th East commercial property during the month of February, 19 75,
less eight days, and its refusal to assess damages for
that unlawful detainer in the amount of $660.00, should
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be reversed with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of Mid Valley in the amount of $660.00.
Likewise, the lower court's refusal to
grant bond forfeiture to Mid Valley in the amount of
$300.00 should be reversed with instructions to
effect the bond forfeiture.
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